Winograd Committee

   The Winograd Committee of Inquiry was established to examine how Israel's government and the defense establishment conducted the Second Lebanon War (2006) against Hezbollah and dealt with the Hezbollah threat in the years before the war. The cabinet on 17 September 2006 decided to appoint a Governmental Investigative Committee composed of Judge (ret.) Dr. Eliyahu Winograd, chairman; Prof. Ruth Gavison; Prof. Yehezkel Dror; Major General (res.) Menachem Einan; and Major General (res.) Dr. Haim Nadel to "investigate, and determine findings and conclusions, and . . . present recommendations as it sees fit regarding the political echelons and the security system as pertains to the range of aspects of the campaign in the north which began on July 1, 2006." Although the committee had all the powers of a state commission of inquiry, it was controversial because it was appointed by the prime minister and not the president of the Supreme Court of Israel. On 30 April 2007, the committee submitted to the prime minister and minister of defense an interim report of some conclusions and recommendations. The interim report was strongly critical of the prosecution of the war by the government and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) senior command; it was particularly critical of the decision making of Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert but did not explicitly recommend their resignation from office. It also was highly critical of the management of the war by IDF chief of staff Dan Halutz, who had preempted the report by resigning in January 2007. Finally, the interim report offered a number of recommendations of ways for the IDF to deal with many of the operational and logistical problems highlighted in its prosecution of the Second Lebanon War. Several of those recommendations were immediately implemented by the new IDF command structure instituted by Gabi Ashkenazi, the new IDF chief of staff who replaced Halutz.

   The final report of the Winograd Committee was submitted to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak on 30 January 2008. Calling the Second Lebanon War a "serious missed opportunity" for Israel that had "far-reaching implications for us, as well as for our enemies, our neighbors, and our friends in the region and around the world," it laid responsibility mainly with the IDF, both the leadership at the time of the war and those who had preceded them and allowed a deterioration in overall preparedness, decision-making, and strategic thinking. While finding failings in their management of the war, the report determined that, concerning the crucial cabinet decision of 9 August 2006 to approve the IDF plan to initiate a controversial ground operation against Hezbollah, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and then Defense Minister Amir Peretz had acted on the merits and "on the basis of the facts before them."